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I. INTRODUCTION
Over thirty-five years ago Congress attempted to address wage
discrimination based on sex by requiring that persons in the work-
place must be given equal pay for equal work. Unfortunately, as
the disparities between men's and women's wages persisted, it be-
came apparent that neither Title VII' nor the Equal Pay Act2 had
fulfilled their initial promise.
One reason for this continued gender wage disparity has been
the historic high concentration of women in lower paying, un-
skilled jobs. Vast numbers of women continue to work in female-
" Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. Member of the Na-
tional Academy of Arbitrators.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2000).
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dominated jobs such as clerical work, the food industry, the gar-
ment trades, and retailing, all of which have been historically low
paying. These low wages have tenaciously persisted, even though
many traditionally "female jobs" have objectively been proven com-
parable to, or even more valuable than, "men'sjobs" in terms of re-
sponsibility, training, job conditions, and importance to the em-
ployer.
Thus, not even a vigorously enforced mandate that equal pay
be given for equal work managed to close the gap between wages
paid for "men's work" and for "women's work." For this reason,
starting in 1982, Minnesota became a pioneer in requiring that the
state and other governmental bodies must provide equal pay for
jobs of equal worth. Minnesota's adoption of comparable worth
3
has been a bold move, and one which has enjoyed particular suc-
cess at the state level.
However, efforts to achieve pay equity at the county and local
levels have proven to be much more difficult. This is largely be-
cause, unlike the state, other public employers were not given addi-
tional funds to support this difficult and expensive process. In-
stead, Minnesota's political subdivisions have been left to wrestle
alone with the financial pressures inherent in revamping their
compensation systems, systems in which each employee group typi-
cally competes for the funds that an employer has available for em-
ployee compensation. One significant arena in which that struggle
has taken place has been a process unique to public sector labor re-
lations known as "interest arbitration."
Interest arbitration is a process whereby a neutral outside
party-an arbitrator-unilaterally determines the terms and condi-
tions of a collective bargaining agreement when the parties (typi-
cally a public employer and a public sector union) have not been
able to do so for themselves. The stakes in interest arbitration can
be quite high as, for example, when a single arbitrator determines
how much the teachers in an entire school district should be paid
during the life of the contract.
In making these "final and binding" determinations, interest
arbitrators weigh various criteria, two of which are particularly im-
portant. "External comparison" evidence compares a public em-
ployer's pay for a particular job to the wages those employees
would command in the larger marketplace (e.g., using Minneapolis
3. MINN. STAT. §§ 471.991-999 (2000).
[Vol. 27:2
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and Duluth police officer pay schedules to determine the appro-
priate level of pay for St. Paul officers). "Internal comparison" evi-
dence is used to determine whether a public employer's overall pay
scale appears internally consistent (e.g., comparing the wages or
wage increases of a community's fire fighters with those of its social
workers).
Interest arbitrators historically have given greater weight to
"external comparisons" when making their awards. However, rely-
ing on the larger marketplace to determine how much a particular
job should be paid ignores the fact that the marketplace has not
been kind to women, especially women in "female-dominated"jobs.
Thus, passage of Minnesota's Local Government Pay Equity Act
(LGPEA) 4-which seemingly circumvents the marketplace by re-
quiring equal pay for jobs of equal worth-has conflicted with a ma-
jor factor that interest arbitrators have traditionally relied upon.
As public employers began to struggle with the new demands
of pay equity, it became apparent that Minnesota's interest arbitra-
tors would have to face difficult questions in reconciling the man-
dates of the state's Pay Equity Act with traditional interest arbitra-
tion. One of the most challenging questions raised has been
whether Minnesota law now requires that interest arbitrators give
greater weight to "internal" criteria, so that a public employer's his-
torically "over-compensated" employee groups (e.g., the "male-
dominated" law enforcement classifications) may be forced to ab-
sorb some of the cost of achieving pay equity. Or does the law con-
tinue to accord primary weight to the economics of the market-
place-the "external" data-so that employees may not be
penalized in an employer's quest to achieve pay equity?
Many arbitration awards have been rendered since these ques-
tions first arose. This article reflects upon what we now know from
this large body of arbitral authority and more recent legislative di-
rectives. To explore the interplay between outside market forces
and internal pay equity, the article is divided into six parts. Part II
discusses the background and important role that interest arbitra-
tion plays in resolving public sector collective bargaining disputes.
Part III examines Minnesota's Local Government Pay Equity Act in
more detail, highlighting its underlying goals and how it works.
Part IV recalls the turmoil of the 1980's, as parties and arbitrators
tried to reconcile pay equity with traditional interest arbitration's
4. Id. (referred to as the Minnesota Comparable Worth Law or "CWL").
2000]
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emphasis on outside market forces, while Part V provides a detailed
examination of more recent awards to determine to what degree, if
any, arbitrators now seem to agree on these issues. The Summary,
at Part VI, completes the discussion.
II. INTEREST ARBITRATION
Arbitrators hear two types of labor disputes. "Rights" or "griev-
ance" disputes involve disagreements between management and la-
bor concerning the meaning or application of contract terms the
parties have already agreed upon and memorialized in their collec-
tive bargaining agreement. "Interest" disputes call upon an arbitra-
tor to, in effect, actually write the collective bargaining agreement
by deciding essential provisions which the parties have been unable
to decide for themselves, for example, wages, employee
contributions to a health care plan, or retirement benefits.
Interest arbitration is used frequently in the public sector and
rarely in the private sector. Many state legislatures, including Min-
nesota, have identified certain public employees, such as law en-
forcement personnel, as "essential" employees who should not be
permitted to strike.5 In return for this loss of labor's ultimate lever-
age, essential employees have been granted the right to demand
"interest" arbitration if negotiations with their public employer
reach an impasse. 6 Non-essential employees can also seek interest
arbitration, but do not have a statutory right to insist upon it.7 To
pursue interest arbitration in Minnesota the parties first "certify" to
the Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services the items that are at
impasse and select the arbitrator who will decide those issues. The
parties may not then raise new issues at the hearing.
Arbitrators who decide interest cases do not apply a strict for-
mula but consider the evidence as a whole. Two important bases
for decision are: (1) determining what the parties would likely have
negotiated had they been able to reach agreement at the bargain-
ing table; and (2) avoiding awards that would significantly alter a
bargaining unit's relative standing, whether internally or externally,
unless there are compelling reasons to do so. The types of evi-
dence most often considered with respect to these rationales are
5. MINN. STAT. § 179A.16, subd. 02 and subd. 03 (2000) (defining "non-
essential" and "essential" employees respectively).
6. Id. § 179.16.
7. Id. § 179A.16, subd. 02 (defining "non-essential" employees).
[Vol. 27:2
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 34
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss2/34
PAY EQ UITY IN INTEREST ARBITRATION
frequently referred to as evidence of "external comparability" and
"internal comparability."
"External comparability" evidence-which has historically
been given great weight-compares and contrasts one employee
group's terms and conditions of employment with those provided
to employees who perform the same or similar work for other
"comparable" employers. This evidence addresses the issue of what
the marketplace suggests is an appropriate award.
Parties will often strenuously disagree concerning what com-
prises an appropriate comparability group. For example, a law en-
forcement bargaining unit may argue that the appropriate wage
comparisons for an employer located within a multi-county metro-
politan area are those of the neighboring police departments. By
contrast the employer may argue that, as a small suburban em-
ployer, its police pay scale should not be compared to its more af-
fluent city neighbors, but instead with towns of its same size
throughout the state (who probably pay significantly less). An arbi-
trator must first determine the relevant comparison group and
then decide how much weight to give this evidence.8
The other criterion most often used in interest arbitration is
evidence of "internal comparability." This evidence compares and
contrasts the terms and conditions of employment a public em-
ployer provides to its various employee groups, and is used to de-
termine whether the bargaining unit now in interest arbitration is
or is not being treated appropriately. For example, courthouse
clerical workers may submit evidence of a county's overall compen-
sation schedule to argue that they are underpaid.
Other types of evidence include an employer's "ability to pay"
the wages and benefits which the union seeks. Employers typically
advance this argument in times of economic downturn. However,
8. Note the recent interesting case of Law Enforcement Labor Services. v. Kana-
bec County, BMS Case No. 00-PN-827 (2000) (Jacobs, Arb.) in which ArbitratorJeff
Jacobs agreed that the County's law enforcement personnel were at the bottom of
its comparability group. Nevertheless, Arbitrator Jacobs declined to bring this
group into parity, noting "Kanabec's wage scales have traditionally been at or near
the bottom of the group when compared to other counties in the area." Id. at 7.
Kanabec County [is] very near the bottom of the comparable counties in
terms of its tax base, economy and population. There was no simply (sic)
evidence to compel a radical change in that ranking with regard to the
pay of the officers in question. Certainly, there [is] no compelling evi-
dence that the relative ranking of Kanabec County itself warranted such a
large increase as that sought by the Union.
Id. at 9. Apparently someone must be at the bottom of a comparability group.
2000]
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when finances are not currently an overriding concern, employers
will nevertheless urge fiscal restraint to meet future needs. Evi-
dence of the cost of living index, and an employer's ability to tax,
are also relevant.
III. LOCAL GOVERNMENT PAY EQUITYACT (LGPEA)
In 1982 the Minnesota Legislature directed the state to remedy
wage disparities between its female-dominated and male-dominated
classes, and it gave the state nearly $22 million to do so.9 In 1984,
the Minnesota Legislature re-affirmed its support for the principle
of pay equity by extending similar demands to Minnesota's political
subdivisions (e.g. to counties, cities, schools). However, this time
the legislature did not provide additional funds to support these ef-
forts.
The stated purpose1° of Minnesota's 1984 Local Government
Pay Equity Act (LGPEA) is to "establish equitable compensation12131
relationships between female-dominated,2 male-dominated, 4 and
balanced classes 5 of employees in order to eliminate sex-based
wage disparities in public employment in this state." To achieve
this goal, "[a] primary consideration in negotiating, establishing,
recommending, and approving compensation is comparable work
value 16 in relationship to other employee positions within the po-
litical subdivision."
In effect the LGPEA has required each of the state's 1,600 ju-
risdictions to determine which employees are employed in sex-
segregated "women's work" classifications (defined as more than
9. MINN. STAT. §§ 43A.01-.47 (1998) (also known as the Employees Equitable
Compensation Act).
10. Id. § 471.991, subd. 1 (2000).
11. Id. §§ 471.991-999.
12. Id. at subd. 5. "Equitable compensation relationship" means that the
compensation for female-dominated classes is not consistently below the compen-
sation for male-dominated classes of comparable work value, as determined under
section 471.994, within the political subdivision. Id.
13. MINN. STAT. § 471.991, subd. 6 (2000). A female-dominated class is de-
fined as any class in which seventy percent or more of the members are female. Id.
14. Id. at subd. 7. A male-dominated class is defined as any class in which
eighty percent or more of the members are male. Id.
15. Id. at subd. 2. "Balanced classes" means any class in which no more than
eighty percent of the members are male and no more than seventy percent of the
members are female. Id.
16. Id. at subd. 3. "Comparable work value" is defined as the value of work
measured by teh skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions normally re-
quired in the performance of the work. Id.
[Vol. 27:2
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seventy percent female) 7 and then rate those classifications against
jobs performed by other employees. Where a "female-dominated"
class appears to be "underpaid" based on the ratings assigned to it
and other job classifications (the "comparable work value"18), a
public employer is required to create a plan to bridge that gap.
Initial plans were due byJanuary 31, 1992, and all jurisdictions have
been placed on a subsequent three year reporting cycle, with a
third reporting each year to the state Department of Employee Re-
lations. 9 Failure to comply with these directives can and has re-
sulted in reduced state aid to a local political subdivision.' °
Since the Act was adopted it has applied purely to matters of
pay, including lump sum payments, but has not been interpreted to
demand parity in other respects. As Arbitrator Scoville observed:
It is true that the law did not abolish collective bargaining,
and indeed expected collective bargaining to be part of
the implementation of comparable worth, but it did con-
strain collective bargaining in the interests of pay equity.
Each unit in a "multicraft" setting is less free to negotiate
its relative pay. However, collective bargaining is still free
over non-pay elements of compensation and other terms
and conditions of employment, since the ubiquitous prac-
tice of measuring equity only in terms of pay (and not the
"compensation" stated in the law) has apparently gone
unchallenged.'
Moreover, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has affirmed that
the Local Government Pay Equity Act was enacted to benefit fe-
male-dominated classifications, not male-dominated or balanced
classes of employees.22
17. MINN. STAT. § 471.991, subd. 6 (2000).
18. The comparable work value is determined by the use of ajob evaluation
system. When selecting or developing ajob evaluation system is required to confer
with their employees' exclusive representatives.
19. In 1991 the legislature authorized DOER to adopt rules under the Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act to assure compliance with the LGPEA. The depart-
ment adopted the rule MCAR 3920 in 1992.
20. MINN. STAT. § 477.9981, subd. 6 (1998).
21. Indep. Sch. Dist. 281 v. Robbinsdale Principals' Ass'n, BMS Case No. 89-
PN-148, 2 (1989) (Scoville, Arb.).
22. Armstrong v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of City of St. Paul, 498 N.W.2d 471
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993). See also LELS v. Chisago County, BMS Case No. 95-PN-54,
37 (1995) (Berquist, Arb.) ("In other words, in that they are a male-dominated
class or a balanced class, they are not entitled to the benefits of the Pay Equity Act
by an increase in their wage rates to reflect the amount below the pay equity line
which they are at presently.").
2000]
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IV. EARLY PROBLEMS
In order to provide public employers with breathing space to
conduct their studies and implement their pay equity plans, the Act
provided that employees and unions could not challenge those
plans until August 1, 1987. After that date a number of unions
challenged plans they claimed were flawed and unfair. Most of
those challenges were brought before labor arbitrators and in most
cases they were rejected.23 It soon became apparent that arbitrators
were reluctant to second guess job study results shown to be based
upon a recognized methodology.
The second, more enduring, challenge to pay equity plans
came from unions, most notably those representing law enforce-
ment personnel, who take issue with the effect an employer's plan
has on collective bargaining. This situation arises when a local
subdivision's final wage offer to a "male-dominated" class is lower
than would otherwise be suggested by the marketplace, the mar-
ketplace being the prevailing wage rates for the same job in compa-
rable jurisdictions as measured by the "external comparability" evi-
dence. The offer is usually couched in terms such as "a wage
increase that is consistent with the comparable worth law." The
public employer justifies its offer on the grounds that the only way
to meet the LGPEA's requirements is to freeze the wages of "over-
compensated" 4 classes to provide the necessary funds to bring the
23. For example, in Independent School District 281, Robbinsdale v. Robbinsdale
Principals'Association, BMS Case No. 89-PN-148, 2 (1989) (Scoville, Arb.), Arbitra-
tor Scoville noted:
The Association raises only one procedural issue about the implementa-
tion of pay equity in ISD 281, maintaining that no one ever told the prin-
cipals that their pay might be affected by the results of the Pay Eq-
uity/Job Evaluation Exercise. This is not a substantial flaw in an
otherwise carefully documented record of meticulous attention to the
law's requirements. Furthermore, even after it should have become ap-
parent that the process was affecting employees' pay all across the State,
no appeal or request for reevaluation was filed by the Association or its
members.
24. In LELS v. City of Crookston, BMS Case No. 93-PN-583, 4 & n.1 (1993)
(Lundberg, Arb.), Arbitrator James Lundberg considered the notions of "over-
compensated" and "under-compensated":
While the term "overcompensated" has been used in many arguments
and may (sic) Arbitration Awards, it is important to recognize that the fo-
cus of the Local Government Pay Equity Act is on "underpaid" female-
dominated employee groups. When the wages of city employees are
generally lower than those paid in comparable cities, the question be-
comes, "Overcompensated, as compared to what?" While wage increases
[Vol. 27:2
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"under-compensated" classes into an equitable relationship. In re-
buttal, the unions have argued that the legislature never intended
that pay equity would penalize classes of employees, and that tradi-
tional external comparisons remain the most appropriate bench-
mark in setting wages.
The issue was aptly framed by Arbitrator Bard in LELS v. City of
Wayzata
25:
When an arbitrator has before him a male-dominated
class that appears to be presently overpaid based on the
point value given to its position, is the legislative mandate
to bring the wages of the male class down or to suppress
wage increases in order to make the establishment of eq-
uitable compensation relationships with female classes
easier and less expensive for the City to achieve?
26
Two schools of thought quickly emerged concerning this di-
lemma. One school has held that arbitrators deciding wage issues
should rely primarily upon traditional "external" criteria. Under
this approach the wages of male-dominated groups, most notably
police and fire employees, would continue to be set in large part by
the marketplace, with no erosion based on pay equity considera-
tions. By contrast, public employers have argued that when gender
based wage disparities are found within the workplace, pay equity
for overcompensated male-dominated groups have been held down, un-
derpaid female-dominated groups have received larger wage increases
that have generally moved city wage schedules toward compliance with
the Pay Equity Act.
25. BMS Case No. 87-PN-606, 33 (1988) (Bard, Arb.).
26. Similarly, in 1990 attorney Frank Madden articulated a host of related
questions:
What is the interplay between internal value and market when both are
stated in the statute as criteria in determining wages? From a collective
bargaining standpoint is it realistic to expect that the requirements of Pay
Equity can co-exist with collective bargaining when there is diversity of in-
terest of employees and unions dependent upon the results of the Pay
Equity study? .... Should arbitrators look to the primary purpose of the Pay
Equity Act to render an award which emphasizes the deceleration of over-
compensated positions with the simultaneous intent of accelerating un-
der-compensated positions? On the other hand, should arbitrators revert
to the traditional standards of interest arbitration, emphasizing market
which in turn tends to substantially burden the public employer finan-
cially, spiral the wage trend line and make the implementation of pay
equity for undercompensated classes a perpetual problem of chasing the
higher paid classes?
FRANK MADDEN, MINNESOTA INSTITUTE OF LEGAL EDUCATION, INTEREST ARBITRATION,
LAw ENFORCEMENT AND PAY EQUITY-EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVE (Public Sector Labor
Law, IV.17) (6th ed. 1990).
20001
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requires that "internal" comparisons drive future wages, even if that
means freezing or slowing down some employee groups' wage in-
creases.
The tension between these two views has been apparent from
the outset. Especially in the early years, interest arbitrators often
diverged markedly in explaining their awards. Such divergence was
not surprising considering the -ambiguity and conflicting provisions
within the LGPEA itself, especially in the wake of its numerous
amendments.
A. Legislative History
1. Affirming The Marketplace
When the LGPEA was enacted in 1984 it unequivocally stated
that comparable work value was "the primary consideration" in set-
ting compensation. Now, however, it is simply "a primary consid-
eration." Moreover, in 1990 the legislature eliminated the term
"primary consideration" from the definition "equitable compensa-
tion relationship" altogether, with that term now defined simply as
when "the compensation for female-dominated classes is not con-
sistently below the compensation for male-dominated classes of
comparable work value." 7
In 1984 the LGPEA expressly stated that'an interest arbitrator
"shall follow" the equitable compensation plan of the local subdivi-
sion when making a wage award; it did not mention applying any
other standards. However, in 1986, after considerable debate in
the conference committee, the legislature diluted that directive in
two important ways: interest arbitrators now simply "shall consider"
(rather than "follow") comparable work value, and they shall do so
together with "other standards appropriate to interest arbitra-
tion. ,, 8 "Other standards" have always included market data.
2 9
27. MINN. STAT. § 471.991, subd. 5 (1990).
28. Minnesota Statute section 471.992, subdivision 2 now provides:
In all interest arbitration involving a class other than a balanced class
held under sections 179A.01 to 179A.25, the arbitrator shall consider the
equitable compensation relationship standards established in this section
and the standards established under section 471.993, together with other
standards appropriate to interest arbitration. The arbitrator shall con-
sider both the results of ajob evaluation study and any employee objec-
tions to the study. In interest arbitration for a balanced class, the arbitra-
tor may consider the standards established under this section and the
results of, and any employee objections to, a job evaluation study, but
shall also consider similar or like classifications in other political subdivi-
[Vol. 27:2
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Arbitrator J.C. Fogelberg summarized the effect of these
changes:
Certainly one of the more difficult problems facing an ar-
bitrator involved in the pay equity malaise is the 1986
amendment to the law wherein Section 471.992, Subd. 2,
was changed from "the arbitrator shall follow the equita-
ble compensation relationships established" under the
act, to "shall consider" such internal relation-
ships,"... together with other standards appropriate to in-
terest arbitration. Clearly the change altered the law sig-
nificantly-making it something less than imperative to
strictly adhere to the results of a public employer's com-
parable worth pay format. The operative (yet general)
phrase, "together with other standards appropriate to in-
terest arbitration" in this Arbitrator's view, reduced the
relative significance of a comparable worth plan. Under
the wording of the statute, comparable worth is no longer
the paramount consideration. Were this true there would
be no logical reason to amend the statute in the manner
in which it was done in 1986. Neither, however, does the
new language allow the reviewer to completely ignore
comparable worth, or to determine that it is somehow in-
applicable to disputes involving male-dominated job clas-
sifications as the union argues.
The more recent amendments to the act have broadened
the discretionary authority of the reviewing neutral....
There is no clear mandate which would quiet the ongoing
debate regarding the importance of comparable worth vis-
a-vis external comparisons, the Consumer Price Index,
ability to pay, and other factors commonly applied in im-
passe disputes. Nowhere is there any statutory directive
which ranks the relative importance of such criteria, indi-
cating to an arbitrator the amount of emphasis that could
be given one factor as opposed to another.
2. Preserving Reliance On Pay Equity Considerations
Despite the apparent erosion of the LGPEA's protections fol-
lowing these amendments, those who sought to continue to make
sions.
29. MINN. STAT. § 471.992, subds. 2, 4 (2000).
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pay equity a primary consideration pointed to the Act's continued
insistence that comparable work value shall remain "a primary con-
sideration",3 in determining public sector wages to achieve the Act's
stated purpose to "establish equitable compensation relationships
between female-dominated, male-dominated, and balanced classes
of employees in order to eliminate sex-based wage disparities in
public employment in this state. 32
The Act's omission of external market factors from the defini-
tion of the "reasonable relationship" which employers are required
to achieve is also deemed significant.33 Indeed, despite the legisla-
tive efforts of 1986 and 1990, the Act still expressly provides that
the "plan need not contain a market study" at all. 4
In addition, the Act's only specific reference to weighing mar-
ketplace evidence is its directive that "in interest arbitration for a
balanced class" the arbitrator "shall also consider similar or like clas-
sifications in other political subdivisions".3 5 By contrast, for "a class
other than a balanced class" (i.e., a male or female-dominated
class) the Act directs the arbitrator to consider in addition to pay
equity factors "other standards appropriate to interest arbitra-
tion. ', 36 It is possible to argue that the legislature's use-within the
same provision-of a more specific directive for "balanced" classes,
and a more general directive for female and male-dominated
classes, indicates that marketplace evidence should be weighed less
heavily in those latter cases, the pay equity cases.
One interesting aspect of this balanced/unbalanced class di-
chotomy is the fact that as a class achieves gender balance, the
mandates of pay equity become irrelevant and arbitrators are free,
if they wish, to rely primarily on external comparisons. Indeed this
is happening, most notably as more women are being employed in
previously male-dominated classes. For example, in LELS v. City of
Osseo"7 the employee group in arbitration was comprised of "all
non-supervisory sworn personnel employed in the Employer's Po-
lice Department-three Police Officers." As one of those three of-
ficers was a woman, the class was "balanced." Thus, Arbitrator Gal-
31. MINN. STAT. § 471.992, subd. 1 (2000).
32. Id.
33. Id. § 471.993, subd. 2.
34. Id. § 471.9981, subd. 1.
35. Id. § 471.992, subd. 2 (emphasis added); see also MINN. STAT. § 471.992,
subd. 4.
36. Id.
37. BMS Case No. 98-PN-475 (Apr. 23, 1998) (Gallagher, Arb.).
[Vol. 27:2
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lagher had no trouble awarding a Union position "because the evi-
dence about wage rates paid by other metropolitan cities shows that
wages paid by the Employer are substantially below what most other
metropolitan cities are paying."
3 8
3. Duty To Bargain In Good Faith
Another factor confusing the debate on pay equity and interest
arbitration has been the parties' duty to bargain in good faith.
Minnesota law requires that an employer bargain in good faith with
its employees even when it feels constrained by comparable worth
considerations. Despite the Act's admonition that it does "not di-
minish a political subdivision's duty to bargain in good faith,"39
there is real concern about the effect of pay equity plans on the col-
lective bargaining process. "By blindly insisting that wage increases
for [over-compensated] employees conform to the findings of that
study, the City violates its statutory obligation to bargain in good
faith....,40
In 1990 the legislation addressed these concerns by adding
language that "[t] his law may not be construed to limit the ability
of the parties to collectively bargain in good faith, 41 and by permit-
ting the Commissioner of Employee Relations to consider "recent
arbitration awards that are inconsistent with equitable compensa-
tion relationships" when determining whether a public employer
has failed to establish the required equitable compensation rela-
tionship.42 This provision suggests that a public employer's non-
compliance may be excused if it stems from an interest arbitrator's
decision.3
B. The Early Cases
It is not surprising that the 1984 LGPEA was greeted with a
wave of controversy and confusion. Suddenly public employers
38. Id. at 8.
39. MINN. STAT. §§ 471.992, subd. 1 and 471.9966 (2000).
40. Minnetonka Police Ass'n. v. City of Minnetonka, BMS Case No. 88-PN-
724, 5 (1989) (Ver Ploeg, Arb.).
41. MINN. STAT. § 471.992, subd. 1.
42. Id. § 471.9981, subd. 6(b)(3).
43. Id. Also relevant is new language in the Act's penalties section which
permits the Commissioner to suspend penalties if "noncompliance results from
factors unrelated to the sex of the members dominating the affected classes and
that the subdivision is taking substantial steps to achieve compliance to the extent
possible." MINN. STAT. § 471.9981, subd. 6(c).
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were forced to re-do their entire compensation schemes to remedy
historic wage discrimination against persons in female-dominated
classes. Moreover, consistent with the state's "continuing tendency
to mandate programs/services but fail to provide adequate fund-
ing"44 these political subdivisions were given no state money to ful-
fill this predictably expensive and complicated state directive.
At first some employee groups did not appreciate the full im-
plications of this effort. However, when the new compensation
plans took effect, and the direct link between a job's rating and its
wages became apparent, persons adversely affected by the change
reacted strongly. In particular, employees in job classifications
found to be "male-dominated" and "over-paid" mobilized quickly.
In 1990 Rolland Toenges, former Director of Hennepin County's
Labor Relations Department, described those initial reactions:
[M]ost employees do not perceive the pay equity system as
providing a true indication of their worth... the outcome
of a job evaluation study tends to leave most employees
dissatisfied. It is my observation that most employees be-
lieve that if anyone with their head screwed on straight
would properly evaluate their job, they would know that
they are undercompensated compared to other employ-
ees.
[I]mplementing the concept of comparable worth
through negotiations has proven a very formidable task.
Yet, there have been surprises. Some of the occupational
groups found to be overcompensated have been what I
would describe as grudgingly cooperative. This has been
more characteristic of the non-essential, traditional male-
dominated occupations. On the other hand, essential
employee units found to be overcompensated have been
far less willing to accept the)ob study outcome with reso-
lution usually in arbitration.
At first the unions who represented these groups challenged
the plans' methodology, arguing that certain jobs, for example, law
enforcement and fire fighting, were underrated and deserved more
points. However, those challenges proved largely unsuccessful as
44. Minn. Teamsters Pub. & Law Enforcement Employees Union, Local 320
v. City of Mound, BMS Case No. 94-PN-1168, 19 (Sept. 11, 1995) (Boyer, Arb.).
45. ROLLAND TOENGES, MINNESOTA INSTITUTE OF LEGAL EDUCATION, NEGOTIA-
TIONS UNDER THE MINNESOTA PAY EQUITY ACT: AN EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVE, 6-7 (Pub-
lic Sector Labor Law, III) (6th ed. 1990).
[Vol. 27:2
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arbitrators agreed that "despite their inherent problems and inher-
ent subjectivity, job evaluation studies are in wide use and the use
of those studies are in fact legislatively mandated in Minnesota un-
der the CWL."
46
Despite this relative agreement on the studies themselves,
strong arbitral disagreement arose when employees went to interest
arbitration on the question of wages. For the first time a statute di-
rected that a factor outside the realm of traditional bargaining and
interest arbitration-"equitable compensation relationships" based
on gender-be made "the primary consideration" in setting wages.
With marketplace data not even mentioned in the statute, public
employers argued that external comparison evidence was no longer
relevant "in negotiating, establishing, recommending, and approv-
ing compensation." 47 This flew in the face of many arbitrators' long
standing and deeply held views of the nature of the collective bar-
gaining and arbitral processes. One such concern was expressed in
an arbitration involving the LELS and the City of Burnsville:
Some of an arbitrator's decision making authority is
eliminated by the public employer's interpretation of
comp worth .... It will decide what is required to comply
with the statute, and it will decide by arbitrarily negotiat-
ing with other units what the Arbitrator can and cannot
do in so far as raising the wages of essential employees are
concerned.8
A related concern was that because the studies are done on a
subdivision-wide basis there could be a loss of unit by unit bargain-
46. AFSCME, Council No. 14 v. City of Burnsville, BMS Case No. 88-PN-829
(1989) (Bard, Arb.). Expanding on this theme, ArbitratorJack Flagler noted:
The only guidance provided to interest arbitrators in state law requires
that we consider the public employer's pay equity plan. Nothing in this
limited statutory reference can be read as empowering an interest arbi-
trator to undertake a sweeping review of a public employer's pay equity
plan which has been prepared by a competent and widely used profes-
sional consulting firm. Neither does the law contemplate action by an in-
terest arbitrator to carve such exceptions as may serve to undermine the
essential strategies and mechanisms of the plan.
AFSCME Council No. 14 v. County of Hennepin, BMS Case No. 87-PN-552 (1987)
(Flagler, Arb.).
47. MiNN. STAT. § 471.992, subd. 1 (2000).
49. E.g., LELS v. City of Burnsville, BMS Case No. 88-PN-891, 10 (1989)
(Bard, Arb.); see also Minnetonka Police Ass'n. v. City of Minnetonka, BMS Case
No. 88-PN-724, 5 (1989) (Ver Ploeg, Arb.) ("By blindly insisting that wage in-
creases for these employees (i.e. over-compensated employees) conform the find-
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ing if the results of the studies were considered binding.
Such an interpretation in effect would force unions to give up
their right to negotiate contracts independent of the pay arrange-
ments made in other segments of the organization. They would be
bound hand and foot to the same point/dollar relationship as the
first union or employee unit to sign an agreement with the public
employer.49
Some arbitrators' discomfort with according primacy to "equi-
table compensation relationships" may also have stemmed from
their relative lack of understanding of the concept of pay equity, as
well as the significant influence wielded by the unions who chal-
lenged these new plans-an influence reflected in the 1986 and
1990 amendments previously discussed.5
Soon after August 1987, when the Act first permitted the pay
equity studies and plans to be challenged, most arbitrators contin-
ued to accord greater weight to the external comparison evidence.
Only a few arbitrators favored giving greater consideration to in-
ternal comparisons when pay equity was involved. By early 1989,
however, a more distinct split had become apparent over this ques-
tion.
Interest arbitrators who relied upon the internal pay equity
data in making their awards emphasized the Act's goal of remedy-
ing wage discrimination based on gender. Arbitrator Jack Flagler
observed:
While the law may permit an arbitrator to balance the im-
pact of a particular pay equity formula against other tradi-
tional interest arbitration criteria, nothing in the Statute
can be read as contemplating an award which would un-
dermine the express purpose of the Act which is to bring
undercompensated jobs into reasonable alignment with
overcompensated jobs.5
Arbitrators who concluded that using market forces to decide
wage levels could easily defeat this purpose 2 agreed with Arbitrator
49. Teamsters 320 v. County of Benton, BMS Case No. 88-PN-512, 10 (1989)
(Bard, Arb.).
50. Supra Part W.A.
51. Minneapolis Special Sch. Dist. No. 1 & Minneapolis Pub. Schs. Admin.
Supervisory Personnel, BMS Case No. 86-PN-652, 9 (1986) (Flagler, Arb.).
52. E.g., Moorhead Firefighters Ass'n, Local 1323 v. City of Moorhead, BMS
Case No. 89-PN-190, 10 (1989) (Powers, Arb.):
In spite of the amendments which direct an arbitrator to consider other
factors, the emphasis is still on fashioning an award consistent with pay
equity considerations. The legislature intended that a pay equity study be
[Vol. 27:2
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Flagler that:
If the Minnesota Comparable Worth Law is to succeed in
substantially reducing and eventually eliminating gender-
based pay inequities, it must accomplish its legislative
purpose through moderating those market forces which
have so clearly favored male-dominated jobs and as a cor-
ollary have so disfavored female-dominated jobs. 3
Thus, the lines of the debate were drawn. However, those
lines were not so rigid as they first appeared. As the confusion per-
sisted, and as the LGPEA began to be amended, adherents to each
view began to acknowledge that neither could command absolute
allegiance. Interest arbitration always had been, and continued to
be, a balancing process. The difference now was that more was
thrown into the mix. Even the most vocal defenders of the mar-
ketplace conceded that internal comparisons should prevail in two
instances: (1) where female-dominated or relatively under-
compensated units have been victims of wage discrimination 54 and
(2) when there was evidence that using the marketplace to deter-
mine the wages of an already "over-compensated" class would place
55an extreme burden on a public employer's resources.
By the same token, neither did the proponents of internal
comparisons ignore the traditional deference given to market
forces: "[I] t is clear that market data cannot be ignored. Evidence
of external comparables has traditionally been heavily weighed in
interest arbitration, and the 1986 amendments to Minnesota's
comparable worth law make clear that those traditional standards
the first consideration by both the employer in negotiating wage in-
creases and the arbitrator in fashioning an award.
Information provided to local governments by the State of Minnesota in A Guide to
Implementing Pay Equity in Local Government (Minnesota Department of Employee
Relations, 1984) noted:
The law says that a primary consideration in wage-setting is "comparable
work value in relationship to other employee positions within the politi-
cal subdivision." However, it allows for consideration of other factors, in-
cluding "reasonable relationship to similar positions outside of that po-
litical subdivision's employment." At the state level, almost identical
language has been interpreted to mean that pay equity is the most impor-
tant consideration, although exceptions can be made for demonstrated
recruitment problems.
53. Teamsters 320 v. City of Stillwater, BMS Case No. 88-PN-926, 3 (1989)
(Flagler, Arb.).
54. Id. at 9.
55. LELS v. City of Wayzata, BMS Case No. 87-PN-606, 34 (1988) (Bard, Arb.).
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remain relevant., 56 Indeed, at least one proponent of pay equity
embraced the value of market data in achieving the goal of pay eq-
uity:
I firmly believe that giving appropriate weight to market
wages will work to the benefit of the female dominant oc-
cupations both in the short and in the long run .... Ele-
mental logic dictates that unless a market-driven wage for
male-dominant jobs is maintained, there can be no stable
benchmark to which female dominant jobs ought to be
raised.57
Nevertheless, despite occasional concessions from both sides
in the marketplace/pay equity debate, it is fair to say that the deci-
sions issued in the 1980's remained largely confused. In many
cases interest arbitrators acknowledged the competing evidence
and arguments and then jumped directly to their award, avoiding
taking a definitive stand on the dilemma. The question now is
whether more recent interest decisions have achieved a more de-
finitive and harmonious resolution of those earlier difficult issues.
V. RECENT DECISIONS
With the 1980's ending on such a confused note, 8 the predict-
able question has become: did the 1990's produce any accord on
the difficult issues that pay equity introduced to interest arbitra-
tion? To answer this question this author reviewed the Minnesota
interest awards of the past decade that most directly wrestled with
these issues. After reviewing over 40 such awards,59 this author has
concluded that Arbitrator William Berquist's analysis, articulated in
1995, comes closest to capturing the approach now adopted by the
majority of, although by no means all, interest arbitrators. In LELS
v. Chisago County Arbitrator Berquist observed:
Initially, arbitrators as to public interest arbitration of es-
sential employees such as the public service employees in-
volved here, used external comparisons as their primary
56. LELS v. City of East Grand Forks, BMS Case No. 88-PN-584, 6 (1989) (Ver
Ploeg, Arb.).
57. Teamsters Local 320 v. County of Anoka, BMS Case No. 88-PN-288, 3
(1988) (Flagler, Arb.).
58. Described in Christine Ver Ploeg & Phyllis Marion, Comparable Worth in
Arbitration, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1223 (1990).
59. Copies of all interest arbitration awards are maintained by the Minnesota
Bureau of Mediation Services in St. Paul, Minnesota.
60. BMS Case No. 95-PN-54, 11-12 (1995) (Berquist, Arb.).
[Vol. 27:2
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pricing standard for wages. Then when the Minnesota
Pay Equity Act came into existence and became predomi-
nant, internal consistencies became one of the main pri-
mary important considerations. The experience since has
been for arbitrators to give added weight and priority to
internal comparables as to wages unless the proper exter-
nal comparables demonstrate that the counties' public
service employees.. .are substantially underpaid as com-
61pared to proper external comparables.
Arbitrators who utilize this approach reconcile the competing
demands of pay equity and the marketplace by giving initial defer-
ence to a public employer's internal comparison evidence, which
includes pay equity. They then issue awards largely consistent with
those considerations, unless doing so would result in wages "sub-
stantially" below the marketplace.
Numerous arbitrators since LELS v. Chisago County have issued
awards consistent with this approach. However, this approach is by
no means unanimous. Thus, it is necessary to examine a broader
range of arbitral perspectives on the subject.
A. Continuing Alegiance To The Marketplace
In 1992 Arbitrator Steven Bard reiterated his concern that ex-
cessive reliance on internal comparables, as dictated by a compen-
sation plan formulated for pay equity purposes, would defeat the
give and take which is essential to collective bargaining:
[A] neat and clean uniform system of a pure 'pay for
points' world in which all employee groups are compared
internally and compensated on job value alone is not what
the legislature intended and can never completely come
to pass in a world in which both collective bargaining and
interest arbitration still exist. No Arbitrator can fulfill his
statutorily mandated job if he cedes his judgment in these
matters to some computerized model or mechanical sys-
tem whereby 6regression lines make the determination
automatically.
Arbitrator Bard's concerns apparently have not diminished, as
he noted more recently in a 1999 award:
The relative importance of internal comparables and ex-
ternal comparables under the LGPEA has been the sub-
61. Id.
62. LELS v. City of Winona, BMS Case No. 92-PN-891 (1992) (Bard, Arb.).
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ject of much controversy in recent years. The City makes
persuasive arguments in support of its interpretation.
However, this Arbitrator is not prepared to read market
considerations out of the law, nor to relegate external
comparables to a clearly secondary position. To rigor-
ously apply an all jobs analysis to every political subdivi-
sion in the state would yield a pure 'pay for points' system
in which both collective bargaining and interest arbitra-
tion would become absolutely meaningless. All compen-
sation systems would be decided by computer models
generating the appropriate regression lines. This is
clearly not the intention of the LGPEA which in fact ex-
presses quite the opposite in regard to the survival of col-
lective bargaining and to the propriety of interest arbitra-
tors in considering "other standards appropriate to
interest arbitration.
"S
In 1998 Arbitrator Cathryn Olson expressed her agreement
with Arbitrator Bard's view:
To allow a system aimed at "perfect" pay equity under the
LGPEA in all employees compensation relationships is, in
this Arbitrator's opinion, to run the risk of being able to
lock wages on the lowest common denominator rather
than on the free-wheeling give and take of negotiations.6
Although the above statements reflect some of the strongest
language in support of continued deference to the marketplace,
both Arbitrator Bard 65 and Arbitrator Olson 66 also acknowledge that
63. LELS v. City of Lake Crystal, BMS Case No. 99-PN-988, 9 (1999) (Bard,
Arb.).
64. LELS v. City of Winona, BMS Case No. 98-PN-442, 6 (1998) (Olson, Arb.).
65. In LELS v. City of Lake Cystal, BMS Case No. 99-PN-988 (1999) (Bard,
Arb.), Arbitrator Bard indicated:
Notwithstanding the foregoing... [i]n making my award, I will use both
internal and external comp data as mandated by the LGPEA and I will at-
tempt to balance the weight of both sets of data in rendering an appro-
priate wage award for the parties.
However, he did add:
[T] his Arbitrator has always felt uneasy in blindingly awarding what other
represented and underrepresented internal groups have received with-
out also looking to external factors. I believe that this is not only permit-
ted but required, both by the pay equity Act as well as by a common sense
recognition that there may be, and often are, factors which, for example,
would compel a different pay structure for certain employee groups than
for others.
Id. at 10.
66. In LELS v. County of Winona, BMS Case No. 98-PN-442, 4 (1998) (Olson,
Arb.), Arbitrator Olson noted:
[Vol. 27:2
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internal comparisons cannot be ignored. However, they empha-
size, as almost all arbitrators agree, that "[c]learly, external compa-
rabies must be considered when determining wages of a balanced
class., 67 The difference is that many arbitrators speak more force-
fully when describing the weight they accord to pay equity consid-
erations.
B. Deference To Pay Equity Considerations
In 1994, Arbitrator John Boyer issued one of the most forceful
statements yet concerning "the well-documented fact that passage
of the LGPEA incontrovertibly modified the criteria and relative
weight of such to be utilized by any Interest Arbitrator."68 In IBT
Local 320 v. City of Mound he explained that "the explicit and im-
plicit effect was to restrict the Arbitrator's discretionary authority to
'fashion' awards based upon the primacy of traditional external
'market comparisons' and to require greater emphasis be accorded
the Employer's Pay Equity Plan. 69
By the same token, in addressing pay equity's effect on collec-
tive bargaining Arbitrator Scoville acknowledged in 1989 that:
Among general considerations in determining wages in interest arbitra-
tion are internal and external or market comp, the employer's ability to
pay, cost of living data, any prevailing practice within the entity, and em-
ployee turnover/retention. To this mix, the Minnesota legislature has
added pay equity analysis for equitable compensation relationships under
the [LGPEA].
However, Arbitrator Olson cautioned:
Like Arbitrator Bard, I would not withhold increases to male-dominated
groups in order to allow the City's perfect variation of compliance with
the LGPEA via the all jobs line. There was no convincing evidence of-
fered of the City's inability to pay nor was there rebuttal of an historical
placement of Winona police officers' wages in the middle of the estab-
lished comparison jurisdictions.
Id. at 6.
67. LELS v. City of Morrison, BMS Case No. 98-PN-84, 6 (1998) (Miller,
Arb.); see also IBT County of LaSueur v. Teamsters Local 320, BMS Case No. 98-PN-
249 (1998) (Miller, Arb.):
It is noteworthy that even if the Union position had been awarded in its
entirety it would not have placed the County out of compliance with its
Pay Equity Plan... .The Arbitrator is clearly adhering to established arbi-
tral reasoning by using external settlements rather than solely an internal
settlement to arrive at a wage increase which is fair and equitable to both
Parties.
Id. at 14.
68. IBT Local 320 v. City of Mound, BMS Case No. 94-PN-1168, 9-10 (1995)
(Boyer, Arb.).
69. Id. at 10.
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It is true that the law did not abolish collective bargaining,
and indeed expected collective bargaining to be part of
the implementation of comparable worth, but it did con-
strain collective bargaining in the interests of pay equity.
Each unit in a "multicraft" setting is less free to negotiate
its relative pay .... As a result of the comparable worth
legislation, arbitral precedent has concluded that greater
weight must generally be given to issues of pay equity, in
comparison with the traditional interest arbitration crite-
70ria, such as market comparison or cost of living.
Other arbitrators have also observed that "[t] he clear trend in
interest arbitration awards in Minnesota... is to afford greater
weight to internal comparisons."7' As Arbitrator Steven Befort has
noted:
[T]he statute requires that a local government employer
place primary importance on the comparable value ofjob
classifications within the governmental unit in negotiating
and establishing rates of pay. This obligation exists re-
gardless of whether that governmental employer is in or
out of technical compliance with the standards set out in
Minn. Stat. Sec. 471.9981. Moreover, an employer's pre-
sent failure to set pay on an internally consistent basis en-
dangers future compliance because of the potential for
changes in the gender composition ofjob classes.72
From these and other decisions,72 it is apparent that despite
the 1986 and 1990 amendments that arguably weakened the
70. Indep. Sch. Dist. 281 v. Robbinsdale Principals' Ass'n, BMS Case No. 89-
PN-1 48, 2 (1989) (Scoville, Arb.).
71. Dakota County Attorney Employees Ass'n v. Dakota County, BMS Case
No. 96-PN-57, 5 (1996) (Befort, Arb.).
72. Id. at 15 (citation omitted).
73. E.g., IBT Local 320 v. Ramsey County, BMS Case No. 96-PN-997, 10
(1997) (Miller, Arb.) ("Pay equity, as well as the financial ability of a public em-
ployer to finance the arbitrator's awards is critically important in each and every
interest arbitration."); Human Servs. Supervisors Ass'n v. Dakota County, BMS
Case No. 97-PN-837, 3 (1997) (Wallin, Arb.) (finding internal considerations drive
the award on this issue.); LELS v. Beltrami County, BMS Case No. 92-PN-1473, 13
(1992) (Berquist, Arb.) ("This award is consistent with the County's overall com-
pensation system and is consistent with the County's attempt to maintain and keep
in compliance with pay equity under the Local Government Pay Equity Act."); Idat
17 ("As one will note, I have given primary consideration to the effect of the Pay
Equity Act of the State of Minnesota."); County of Goodhue v. LELS, BMS Case
No. 97-PN-539, 10 (1997) (Bard, Arb.) ("In any event, the pay equity arguments of
the County along with the evidence pertaining to this County's present financial
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LPGEA's pay equity directives, a pronounced trend has developed
and persisted whereby a large number of arbitrators now agree that
"It]he Minnesota Pay Equity Act has significantly impacted the
manner in which arbitrators analyze a wage dispute in the public
sector. The Pay Equity Act requires that primary consideration be
given to relative job rank. Thus, an arbitrator must look first to in-
ternal wage comparisons."7'
This is true even where, as in Douglas County v. IBT Local 320,
75
the evidence was clear that:
[t]he Union presented much the better view of how ex-
ternal market comparables should affect the final
wage.... [Notwithstanding the fact the] Union's market
data persuasively shows that the County falls well below
comparable compensation levels for the classifications in-
volved ..... [Arbitrator Flagler, seeming a bit regretful, con-
cluded the] Union's proposal .... simply cannot be ac-
commodated under the rigid Minnesota DOER pay equity
76statistical compliance formula.
C. Applying Pay Equity
1. Non-Compliance As A Factor
Interest arbitrators are highly influenced by evidence that a
public employer is, or might be, out of compliance with the Pay
Equity Act. As previously discussed, employers must provide de-
tailed reports concerning their pay equity status to the state De-
partment of Employee Relations (DOER) every three years. Arbi-
trators have not ignored the fact that non-compliance can and does
result in substantial financial penalties. Echoing Arbitrator Nancy
Power's concern in LELS v. City of Mound78 that "[t]he Department
of Employee Relations has begun enforcing the Act by imposing
penalties and fines, which makes non-compliance more serious and
costly than it has been in the past", Arbitrator Reynolds observed:
The County presented substantial credible evidence that
they are currently regarded by the Minnesota Department
of Employee Relations as being out of compliance with
74. Houston County v. LELS, BMS Case No. 98-PN-1379, 4 (1998)
(Lundberg, Arb.).
75. BMS Case No. 97-PN-866, 9 (1997) (Flagler, Arb.).
76. Id.
78. BMS Case No. 94-PN-1419, 10 (1995) (Powers, Arb.).
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the Pay Equity Act. That out of compliance situation is
subjecting the County to fines. A careful review of the
Union proposal forces a conclusion that it would aggra-
vate the out of compliance standing of the County.
The overwhelming weight of arbitrable opinion in interest
cases in Minnesota since 1990 has placed substantially
greater weight on internal comparisons than on external
comparisons. That is not to say that external comparisons
are not given measurable weight in some cases. In this
case, however, the standing of the County in regard to the
Pay Equity Act compels a strong emphasis on internal
comparisons. 9
Recognizing the compelling weight that arbitrators are giving
to evidence of non-compliance, or possible non-compliance, un-
ions are increasingly running their own computer analyses of an
employer's status. Using the state provided formula, these unions
are offering their own statistical analyses to argue that the public
employer is not in jeopardy.0 This argument sometimes elicits in-
teresting evidence that a change of just one or two employees in a
class can affect whether that class is or is not "balanced." Cautious
employers who elect to maintain a margin of safety will argue that
"compliance with the DOER model is not and should not be the ul-
timate measuring stick of whether a County has complied with the
letter and spirit of the LGPEA in adopting reasonable and equita-
ble compensation relationships for its various employee groups. '' ..
It is unclear to what extent arbitrators will enter the realm of
statistical analysis-a subject that many have probably assiduously
avoided in their schooling and in their careers-to assess whose
computer model best reflects a political subdivision's true situation.
2. Over-Compensated Classes
An arbitrator who determines that pay equity considerations
should apply to an "over-compensated" group's award must then
79. LELS v. McLeod County, BMS Case No. 94-PN-1278, 21 (1995) (Reynolds,
Arb.).
80. E.g., LELS v. City of South St. Paul, BMS Case No. 96-PN-1788, 4 (1997)
(Martin, Arb.) ("With respect to internal comparison, the Union's primary con-
tentions were designed to rebut the City's arguments based upon pay equity stud-
ies.")
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determine how to do so fairly. In City of Mankato v. LELS,2 Arbitra-
tor Flagler outlined four possible ways to accommodate pay equity
concerns when setting wages for an over-compensated class: (1) re-
duce wages of the male-dominated jobs while increasing those of
female-dominated jobs of comparable work value; (2) freeze the
wages of male-dominated classes while accelerating the wage in-
creases of female-dominated classes; (3) raise the wages of male-
dominated classes to the market rate for like political subdivisions
while at the same time raising the wages of female-dominated
classes at an even faster rate; and (4) decelerate the rate of wage
increases for over-compensated classes while simultaneously accel-
erating those increases for under-compensated classes.
Internal comparison proponents have most often adopted the
fourth alternative, on the theory that:
[W] hile the comparable worth law should rarely, if ever,
be used to freeze otherwise justified wage increases, it is
appropriate to utilize that law to decelerate the rates of
increases for over-compensated employees while attempt-
ing to bring under-compensated employees to a more eq-
uitable position.83
This view has been consistent with many employers' efforts,
described by former Hennepin County Labor Relations Director
Rolland Toenges:
[A] chieving pay equity by increasing compensation of all
employees to the level of the higher compensated em-
ployees in each given job value is not considered eco-
nomically possible. Therefore, we have bargained aggres-
sively to achieve equity by moving inequitably
compensated positions toward a point of central ten-
dency. To achieve equity using this approach, employees
compensated above their equity value must agree to no
compensation increase or a smaller compensation in-
crease than that received by employees in general. Hen-
nepin County has not proposed to reduce the compensa-
tion of overcompensated employees.84
Wrestling with this very issue, Arbitrator James Lundberg
adopted this fourth alternative in his interesting analysis of the
wages to be awarded to the Crookston police:
82. BMS Case No. 88-PN-725, 5 (1988) (Flagler, Arb.).
83. LELS v. City of East Grand Forks, BMS Case No. 88-PN-584, 14 (1989)
(Ver Ploeg, Arb.).
84. ROLLAND, supra note 45, at 8.
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The question to be answered in this situation is whether
the Arbitrator should continue to slow the wage increases
for the overcompensated male-dominated groups or
freeze wages. Internal pay equity can be attained by either
mechanism .... If Crookston Police are under-compensated
relative to officers in similar communities but Crookston
Police are overcompensated relative to female-dominated
Crookston employee groups, I infer that female-
dominated Crookston employee groups probably are sig-
nificantly underpaid relative to the broader market.
While slowing wage increases for overcompensated male-
dominated employee groups has generally been adopted
by Interest Arbitrators as the mechanism for attaining
wage equity, the accepted approach has not resulted in in-
stantaneous correction of all historical wage inequities.
Over the course of several years cities have been able to
adjust inequities in their internal pay schedules without
ignoring market forces which are also to be considered in
the development of an equitable compensation plan.
This Arbitrator will allow a wage increase to be paid to the
Crookston patrol officers but will not increase wages to
the average wage being paid similar employees in compa-
rable communities. The Arbitrator is slowing the increase
of wages to patrol officers relative to the market, with the
belief that the City will continue to adjust the wages of
underpaid female-dominated groups to arrive at internal
wage equity.
5
3. Internal Wage Settlement Patterns
It is not unusual for an employer to settle wages with most of
its unions so that those organized employees, as well as the em-
ployer's unorganized employees, are given the same percentage
wage increase. With evidence of such a wide-spread wage pattern,
the question becomes to what extent-if at all-an interest arbitra-
tor should defer to that pattern when considering one employee
group's arguments that they deserve more.
For example, in one case, Hennepin County presented evi-
dence that over 92% of its current employees, both organized and
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unorganized, would receive wage increases of 1.5% in 1994 and 2%
in 1995. Although the Union argued that the employees who
worked in the Hennepin County Detention Center did "uniquely
demanding work at a unique facility," the arbitrator awarded the
same 1.5% and 2% wage increases to this bargaining unit on the
grounds that:
[c] ertainly it is true that one group cannot automatically
be bound to others' settlement patterns. However, the
fact that a pattern is uniformly maintained for almost all
of a large number of employees is strong evidence that
the terms of the pattern are appropriate under existing
conditions. That is, such widespread application of con-
sistent terms compels an Arbitrator to closely scrutinize
the reasons for deviating from those terms for a select
group of employees."
In another case, Arbitrator Miller explained why Minnesota in-
terest arbitrators give preferential weight to clear and consistent in-
ternal wage settlement patterns:
The County's revised final position for 1998 adheres to
the wage settlement that was granted to 96% of the other
County employees. To award this bargaining unit, which
represents only 4% of the total workforce in the County, a
settlement greater than that granted to the overwhelming
majority of other County employees will encourage inter-
est arbitration and undermine the collective bargaining
process and labor relations stability. Moreover, this inter-
nal settlement pattern was not a coincidence. Since at
least 1992, the County has negotiated uniform wage in-
creases among all of its bargaining unit, include this Dep-
uty's Unit. As a result, past bargaining history adheres to
the principles of internal consistency among all bargain-
ing unit.
In an earlier decision, Arbitrator Miller more specifically de-
scribed what is sometimes known as "whipsaw bargaining" to ex-
plain why both labor and management would be anxious to main-
tain consistent wage patterns:
With a settlement rate of 97%, it is clear that both organ-
ized and unorganized employee groups have adhered to
86. AFSCME Council 14 v. Hennepin County, BMS Case No. 94-PN-1431, 5-6
(1994) (VerPloeg, Arb.).
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this same philosophy. This settlement pattern preserves
those units who settle first, so their settlement will not
serve as a floor for other units. The credibility of both the
Employer and the other exclusive representatives is at
stake to maintain the settlement pattern, unless the Union
can produce compelling reasons to deviate from the set-
88tlement pattern.
In summary, it seems clear that-at least where an employer
has maintained a pattern of virtually identical settlements with all
units and unorganized employees-"since 1990 the axiom that
such internal consistency be accorded primacy has emerged and
been consistently applied."89 To the extent that such wage patterns
incorporate pay equity adjustments driven by the LGPEA, giving
preferential weight to those patterns is consistent with the trend
away from external comparisons.
VI. SUMMARY
In summary, when the Minnesota Legislature passed the Local
Government Pay Equity Act in 1984 it acted decisively to ameliorate
the disparities between men's and women's wages that had per-
sisted despite earlier passage of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.
Nevertheless, although many have applauded this decisiveness,
88. LELS v. Hennepin County Sheriff's Dept., BMS Case No. 96-PN-1785, 7-8
(1997) (Miller, Arb.).
89. Minnesota Teamsters Pub. and Law Enforcement Employees' Union Lo-
cal 320 v. City of Mound, BMS Case No. 94-PN-1168, 7 (1995) (Boyer, Arb.); see
also LELS v. Dakota County, BMS Case No. 96-PN-2190, 21 (1997) (Flagler, Arb.)
("Interest arbitrators in Minnesota have increasingly given preferential, though
certainly not exclusive weight to clear and consistent internal wage settlement pat-
terns."); LELS v. Hennepin County, BMS Case No. 96-PN-1785, 17 (1997) (Miller,
Arb.) ("[T]here is no external market justification for the Arbitrator to vary from
the internal settlement pattern that has evolved in Hennepin County."); LELS v.
City of Mound, BMS Case No. 94-PN-1419, 10 (1995) (Powers, Arb.) ("Historically,
the City has maintained a pattern of virtually identical settlements with all units
and unorganized employees"); Minnesota Teamsters Pub. and Law Enforcement
Employees' Union Local 320 v. Ramsey County, BMS Case No. 96-PN-1095, 8
(1996) (Miller, Arb.) ("Clearly, consistency in wage adjustments among law en-
forcement groups is of great important (sic) in maintaining labor relations stabil-
ity. This is particularly true when 99.8% of the County's work force has already
settled"); LELS v. Houston County Sheriff's Dept., BMS Case No. 98-PN-1513, 19
(1998) (Vernon, Arb.). ("The Arbitrator also accepts that pay equity considera-
tions reinforce the importance of the normal equitable considerations raised by an
internal pattern .... If an internal pattern is shown to exist-especially if it is histori-
cally based-it should control unless adherence to that pattern would cause an
unreasonable disparity relative to the external market.").
[Vol. 27:2
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others have had good reason to fault the legislators' failure to pro-
vide financial support for what they should have foreseen would be
a difficult and expensive process.
The difficulty of implementing pay equity immediately became
apparent. Employee groups adversely affected by significantly re-
vised compensation systems thrust themselves into even more vig-
orous competition for a public employer's finite funds. When that
competition extended to interest arbitration, Minnesota's arbitra-
tors were forced to address the difficult questions that pay equity
had introduced to the process. The cases of the late 1980's reflect
the confusion and turmoil that resulted as arbitrators sought rec-
oncile the often ambiguous and conflicting provisions of the
LGPEA with previously well understood principles of interest arbi-
tration.
However, the cases of the 1990's seem to have restored a cer-
tain equilibrium to the process. More recent cases demonstrate a
shift to according primary weight to pay equity considerations, and
to internal comparisons more generally. However, no arbitrator
has disavowed the importance of external comparisons, evidence
that can prove determinative if sufficiently compelling.
Interest arbitrators will, as always, continue to strike a balance
on a case by case basis. The parties' continued willingness to en-
trust such high stakes matters to their final and binding determina-
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